There is a quiet irony unfolding in the back channels of West Asian diplomacy. As the Trump administration attempts to reassert maximum pressure on Iran, a different dynamic has taken root. It is becoming increasingly clear that the Iranians understand Donald Trump far more deeply than he, or his hand-picked emissaries, understand them. With the likes of son-in-law Jared Kushner and billionaire friend Steve Witkoff serving as his primary interlocutors, the Islamic Republic has found itself across the table from diplomatic Lilliputians. And for seasoned State Department veterans watching from the sidelines, the spectacle is one part amusement, two parts quiet horror.
But the miscalculation runs deeper than personnel. America’s attempts to outsource pressure have backfired in ways that only further reveal Tehran’s strategic patience. First, Washington tried using Oman as a negotiating proxy—a quiet, trusted intermediary long accustomed to shuttling between the Islamic Republic and the West. Omani mediators, discreet and effective, had managed to build enough trust to keep channels open. Then came February 28. In the midst of active Omani-mediated discussions, the United States launched an attack without any prior consultation with Muscat. The Omanis were not merely blindsided; they were insultingly barbecued. A proxy’s only currency is credibility, and Washington spent it carelessly. That channel is now dead, another casualty of transactional impulsiveness.
The Americans then turned to Pakistan. The logic is understandable on paper: Pakistan has its own complex relationship with Iran, shares a border, and possesses the one thing that commands respect in the region—an Islamic nuclear arsenal. But Pakistan is no compliant proxy. Islamabad dances to no American tune, least of all when it involves mediating with a neighbor that also happens to be a Shia-majority state facing Sunni-majority Pakistan’s strategic calculations. The Pakistanis are nuclear-armed, proudly independent, and deeply skeptical of being used as Washington’s errand boy—a skepticism forged since the USSR waged war in Afghanistan. More importantly, Pakistan understands what Iran already knows: in the current administration, there is an audience of one.
That audience is POTUS. Not Senator Lindsey Graham, whose boorish, hawkish chants echo into an empty chamber. Not Kushner or Witkoff, whose real estate playbooks have no chapter on nuclear thresholds. Not J.D. Vance or Marco Rubio, however loudly they posture in press interviews. When Pakistan’s interlocutors sit down—whether with Iranians or with American intermediaries—they know that the only number worth dialing is POTUS’s. Every other voice in Washington is background noise. That knowledge alone, fundamentally warps negotiations: it means Pakistan will act not as a faithful agent but as a free agent, advancing its own interests, withholding its cooperation when it sees fit, and never forgetting that it holds nuclear cards of its own.
The contrast with Iran is stark. Iran’s negotiators do not need to guess who is in charge; they have internalized that POTUS prizes deals over doctrine, loyalty over expertise, and spectacle over substance. They watched Oman get burned and learned the lesson: American intermediaries are expendable. They now see Pakistan entering the fray not as an honest broker but as another variable to be managed. And they understand that whether the messenger is Muscat, Islamabad, or Witkoff himself, the real conversation is not about enrichment thresholds or sanctions relief. It is about whether Trump can be made to believe he is winning.
This is the heart of the asymmetry. The Iranians have spent decades learning to read American domestic politics, presidential psychology, and the gap between threat and action. Trump’s envoys, by contrast, are still learning that a handshake in West Asia, does not survive a tweet from Mar-a-Lago. The State Department career corps watches with a mixture of amusement and disdain: amusement at the spectacle of real estate developers and compliant proxies being cycled through like failed properties, disdain because the stakes are a nuclear programme, not a condominium.
In the end, Iran knows how to deal with POTUS because they have made him the centre of gravity. He has not returned the favor. Until Washington understands that no proxy—whether a low-key Oman or a prickly nuclear-armed Pakistan—can substitute for disciplined, professional diplomacy, the pattern will repeat. Oman learned this the hard way on February 28. Pakistan, ever the survivor, will likely do the same. And the Iranians will continue to watch, wait, and quietly advance, knowing that the audience of one is the easiest stage to manipulate. After all, they have the time while the administration has the watch. And it is ticking towards the US midterm elections.
Pasifika Talanoa by a traveled ITaukei Fijian 